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前沿|章奇等-威权主义下的集体抗争:实验中的精英-群众互动策略

栏目:产业经济    来源:互联网    作者:李陈默    发布时间:2017-03-09 17:35

复旦大学经济学院

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前沿|章奇等-威权主义下的集体抗争:实验中的精英-群众互动策略

Politcal Behavior ( May 2016 ) ,Qi Zhang、Dennis Chong、Mingxing Liu发表文章Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism:Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game.

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism:Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

Dennis Chong

Department of Political Science, University of Southern California

Mingxing Liu

China Institute for Educational Finance Research, Peking University

Qi Zhang

School of Economics, China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University

前沿|章奇等-威权主义下的集体抗争:实验中的精英-群众互动策略

作者简介

章奇,复旦大学中国社会主义市场经济研究中心副教授,副研究员。北京大学中国经济研究中心经济学博士,美国西北大学(Northwestern University)政治学博士。研究方向为比较政治经济学、制度经济学、发展经济学、中国经济。在Political Behavior, Studies in Comparative International Development, 经济研究等中外学术刊物上发表了数十篇文章,著有《权力结构、政治激励和经济增长:基于浙江民营经济发展经验的政治经济学分析》一书(格致出版社、上海人民出版社2016年出版)。

内容简介

Abstract:

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves.We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions.We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.

Keywords:

Collective action,Collective resistance,contentious politics, Authoritarian regimes,Elite–mass conflict,Assurance game,Coordination problem

摘要:

关键词:

集体行动;集体抗争;威权主义;精英-大众冲突;确定性博弈;协调问题

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前沿|章奇等-威权主义下的集体抗争:实验中的精英-群众互动策略